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Weyl’s Conception of the Continuum in a
Husserlian Transcendental Perspective
Stathis Livadas
Independent Scholar
is article attempts to broaden the phenomenologically motivated perspective of
H. Weyl’s Das Kontinuum (1918) in the hope of elucidating the dierences between
the intuitive and mathematical continuum and further providing a deeper phe-
nomenological interpretation. It is known that Weyl sought to develop an arith-
metically based theory of continuum with the reasoning that one should be based
on the naturally accessible domain of natural numbers and on the classical rst-
order predicate calculus to found a theory of mathematical continuum free of im-
predicative circularities (such as the standard denition of the least upper bound
of a set of real numbers) only to stumble, to cite a key question, in the evident lack
of intuitive support for the notion of points of the continuum. In this motivation,
I set out to deal from a Husserlian viewpoint with the general notion of points as
appearances reducible to individuals of pre-predicative experience in contrast with
the notion of an interval of real numbers taken as an abstraction based on the in-
tuition of time-owing experience. I argue that the notions of points and of real
intervals in the above sense are not by essence related to objective temporality and
thus their incompatibility in mathematical terms is ultimately due to deeper con-
stituting reasons independently of any causal and spatio-temporal constraints.
Keywords: actual innity, completed totality, continuous unity, intuitive continuum,
individual, iteration principle, mathematical continuum, restriction principle, tem-
poral consciousness, time-point
1. Introduction
is phenomenologically motivated article is primarily based on Hermann
Weyl’s famous monographDas Kontinuum (henceforthDK), rst published
in 1918, and still remaining the broadest known mathematical text in foun-
dations taking into account Husserl’s phenomenology of inner time-con-
sciousness in the problematic of mathematical continuum. I note here that
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100 Weyl’s Conception of the Continuum
Husserl’s studentOscar Becker had also publishedmathematical-philosoph-
ical texts inuenced by the Husserlian phenomenology (Becker 1914; Becker
1927) and has been lately found to have had an interesting correspondence
on these matters with Weyl himself.1
As J. da Silva has put it, the strict adherence of Weyl’s arithmetical the-
ory to what had been disclosed in the phenomenological analysis of intuitive
continuum, most notably the acceptance of everything originally given as
given in its “bodily” form in the modes and the bounds presented therein,
makes it possible that phenomenological ideas can help us achieve a deeper
insight into themathematical theory ofDK (Da Silva 1997, 281). Not toweigh
less in the overall evaluation of the content ofDK is H.Weyl’s general scien-
tic formation and his fundamental work in the theory of relativity2 which
made him especially apt in grasping the fundamental questions that a deeper
analysis of spatiotemporal continuum generates, especially in the face of cer-
tain theoretical deciencies with regard to a predicative foundation of con-
tinuum in taking into account the nature of the system of real numbers. It
should be added that interest in Weyl’s program for the arithmetical foun-
dation of mathematics initiated with Das Kontinuum, originally overshad-
owed by Hilbert’s nitistic foundations program in mathematics and L.E.J.
Brouwer’s intuitionistic theory, has been to a certain extent revived thanks
to a considerable research work that has helped underline its signicance
for a viable predicative theory in mathematics (Feferman 1998, 249).3 It is
notable, though, that in the years following the rst publication of DK and
possibly due to insurmountable diculties in eliminating, among others,
an impredicative denition of the least upper bound principle for reals as
well as certain measurability results, Weyl abandoned the phenomenologi-
cal motivation of the original system of DK to espouse Brouwer’s intuition-
istic model of choice sequences. Later on he even went so far as to deny the
relevance of phenomenological analysis altogether with regard to classical
mathematics, especially in taking the latter as an objectifying metatheory
for physics, on the assumption that Hilbert’s formalism prevails over intu-
itionism. Of course it is known that Hilbert’s formalism and his nitistic
consistency program formathematics suered a serious blow just a few years
1 On the correspondence betweenWeyl and Becker see the work of T. Ryckman and P.Man-
cosu in (Ryckman andMancosu 2002; Ryckman andMancosu 2005).e reader is also re-
ferred to (Ryckman andMancosu 2002) for details onWeyl’s rst exposure to phenomeno-
logical analysis dating back to his graduate years between 1904 and 1908. In Weyl’s own
confession it was around 1912 in Göttingen that he “owed toHusserl’s inuence a liberation
from his previous positivistic allegiances” (Ryckman and Mancosu 2002, 132).
2 See, for instance, his Space-Time-Matter (1922), rst published in the same year as DK.
3 Among the recent literature on the subject one can cite (Feferman 2000), (Feist 2002) and
(Feist 2004).
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ahead with Gödel’s incompleteness results.4 However, I will leave out of dis-
cussion Weyl’s subsequent estrangement from Husserlian phenomenology
and try instead to oer a deeper phenomenological perspective to certain
key concepts of the DK system with regard to the mathematical vs intuitive
continuum.
GenerallyWeyl’s approach inDKmay be viewed in the wake of the theo-
retical discussions provoked byCantor’s introduction in the late 19th century
of the theory of innite ordinals and cardinals as well as the notion of trans-
nite sets in the foundations of mathematics, and the subsequent attempts
to secure a sound foundation of set theory excluding apparent antinomies
such as the set of all sets. In this general setting Weyl was largely inuenced
by Poincaré’s denitionist approach of mathematics which implied the ac-
ceptance of the following general positions:
(i) the concept of a natural number sequence as an irreducible mini-
mum of any abstract mathematical thought and the ensuing acceptance of
the principle of induction as a key proof-theoretic tool; (ii) the acceptance
that all other mathematical concepts, e.g., those of sets and functions, are to
be introduced by an explicit denition founded on the acceptance of position
(i); (iii) the thesis that there are not in principle completed innite totalities;
and (iv) the claim that denitions which single out a denite mathematical
object by implicit or explicit reference to an assumed complete totality of
which the dened object is a part should be excluded altogether frommath-
ematics. Position (iv) is apparently the predicativist position in mathemat-
ics which in later years provided for many theoretical discussions and also
for alternative approaches in the mathematical foundations (Feferman 1998,
254). Except for those properly espousing the denitionist-predicativist ap-
proach of mathematical theories, the acceptance of the domain of natural
numbers as the most fundamental domain of mathematical intuition is to
be found also in Kurt Gödel’s writings suggesting that arithmetic in mathe-
matics is the domain of elementary indisputable evidence that may be most
ttingly compared with sense perception in the case of sensory knowledge
(Tieszen 2011, 176). In a certain sense this view is reected in Husserl’s writ-
ings too with reference, for instance, to the determination of thematic ob-
jects (including perceptual ones) in the form of “and so on” in which every
object-substrate of determination is always passively pregiven with an orig-
inal horizon of indeterminate determinability “beyond the succession of ac-
tually constituted determinations and open to new properties which must
be expected” (Husserl 1939, 217–218).
4 A discussion of Weyl’s later objections to phenomenological analysis in relation to math-
ematics, as presented by him in the mathematics seminar of the university of Hamburg in
1927, is undertaken by J. Toader in (Toader 2013a) and (Toader 2013b).
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On this account,Weyl’s threemajor theoretical positions can be summed
up as follows: (i) denitionism as the conditioning of the introduction of any
ideal entity on the explicit relations linking its constituent elements; (ii) intu-
itionism implying a mathematical universe in which all entities are assumed
to be generated by logical principles from a basic category of objects given
intuitively as primitive objects and relations irreducible to anything seman-
tically more fundamental. In contrast to Brouwerian intuitionism, Weyl’s
original version admits of a denite truth-value for every well-built propo-
sition involving only primitive objects and consequently does not contra-
dict the Excluded Middle Principle; (iii) predicativism as the rejection of
every impredicative denition, that is, of every denition that presupposes
the knowledge of the totality of objects amongwhich the object to be dened
is taken.is position is materialized by restricting the scope of quantiers
to primitive entities alonewhich are taken in the terminology of the ramied
type theory of Principia Mathematica as objects of Level 1. Weyl was partic-
ularly attentive to avoid the circulus vitiosus of impredicative denitions by
restricting the use of quantiers in the set-theoretic comprehension scheme
and was attentive as well to avoid the pitfalls of set-theoretical antinomies
by subjecting the ∈ relation to type restrictions.
In view of the three positions above implying the existence of a basic cat-
egory of primitive objects and relations and the additional condition of com-
pleteness of the number system involved, Weyl conceived of natural num-
bers as intuitively the most proper such category. e completeness of the
basic category involved here is taken in the sense of existence of a denite
totality generated by an indenite iteration, this latter thought in turn as a
homogeneous relation of its elements, i.e., of the successor relation starting
from the element named 1 (Bernard 2009, 161). e intuition of iteration
makes it possible to apply the notion of completeness of natural numbers to
every totality of ideal objects isomorphic to it.
What is more, this structure not only guarantees a well-denedmeaning
to the logical expressions “there is a natural number n such that. . . ” or “for
every natural number n such that. . . ” to dene a new entity, but it also helps
found the possible denition of a new entity by extending these expressions
to include a sequence of sets iterated by a homogeneous functional relation
Φ(Xi , X j), where the Xis are sets of the same category. One may then de-
ne a new entity, e.g., by virtue of the existential formula “there is some set
among the sequence < X1, X2, . . . , Xn , . . . > such that. . . .” As we will see in
the next sections in spite of the intuitive clarity due mainly to the natural
intuition of natural numbers as an ontological-categorial domain, Weyl was
sooner or later to be faced with the diculty of applying his arithmetical-
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predicative scheme to capture the inherent impredicativity of mathematical
continuum.
e present paper as rather philosophically oriented will not enter into
the mathematical technicalities of Weyl’s proposed arithmetical theory of
continuum, at least no more so than what is thought to be enough to com-
prehend the mathematical content of the issues raised in relation to the na-
ture of continuum. GivenWeyl’s orientation toward interpreting the incom-
patibility between the intuitive continuum as associated with a continuous
ow of time and the durationless character of (natural) numbers (meant as
temporal points) in terms of the phenomenology of internal time, I will be
mostly focused on elucidating the character of points as appearances in their
most abstract form of “empty-of-content” individuals-objects of intention-
ality and as noematical5 objects within a constituted, immanent6 continuous
unity.is unity is not, in principle, identiable with the real-world spatio-
temporal continuity. In this level of discourse it will be seen that Weyl’s un-
dertaking to describe the continuum of mathematical analysis based on the
basic ontological-relational domain of natural numbers is bound to reach
the impasse of an inherent incompatibility whose origin is well beyond the
formal-mathematical realm, which is to say that itmay be taken as ultimately
founded on the subjective origin of the self-constituting inner temporality.
To this goal an in-depth analysis will be undertaken of points as intentional
individuals and of actual innity (in the sense of a completed totality) as
rooted in the continuous immanent unity of each one’s consciousness.
2. A critical review of Weyl’s treatment of the dialectical
opposition of points vs. continuum
In a rst reading of Weyl’s foundation of mathematical continuum in DK
(Weyl 1994, Ch. 2, §6) one may note a distinct view between, on the one
5 A noematical object, a phenomenological term, is constituted by certain modes as a well-
dened object immanent to the temporal ux of a subject’s consciousness possibly trans-
formed, in the sense of a formal-ontological object, to a syntactical object of a formal the-
ory. It can then be said to be given apodictically in experience inasmuch as: (1) it can be
recognized by a perceiver directly as a manifested essence in any perceptual judgement (2)
it can be predicated as existing according to the descriptive norms of a language and (3) it
can be veried as such (as a re-identifying object) in multiple acts more or less at will. For
more details on this concept and the general meaning of noema the reader may consult
Husserl’s Ideas I (1976, §87–§94).
6 e term immanent which is widely used in Husserlian and generally phenomenological
texts can be roughly explained as referring to what is or has become correlative (or “co-
substantial”) to the being of the ux of consciousness in contrast to what is “external” or
transcendental to it. For instance, a tree is external as such to the consciousness of an
observer while its appearance as the image of it within his consciousness is immanent to
it.
104 Weyl’s Conception of the Continuum
hand, real numbers in terms of an abstract scheme representing ever embed-
ding parts within a denite whole (with continuous functions as uniquely
dened dependencies of overlapping “continua”) and, on the other, time-
and space-points as “non-existent” individuals within an ever in-act tempo-
ral ow which are eventually considered as abstractions of what is immedi-
ately given in experience. In Weyl’s view, “the exhibition of a single point is
impossible” and further “as points are not individuals they cannot be char-
acterized by their properties,” in contrast to the formal treatment of the ele-
ments of the continuum of real numbers considered as genuine individuals.
In fact, there is a clear distinction in the way points may be treated as “indi-
viduals” in a theory of synthetic (without co-ordinates) homogenous space
and the way they are treated in terms of the arithmetico-analytic concept of
a real number which belongs to the purely formal sphere where “. . . those
ideas thoroughly crystallize into full deniteness.”
Further, in a next level, there is little evidence that time- or space-points
as individuals of an arithmetized theory of time and space correspond to
what is immediately given in (intentional) experience, in other words, there
is a separation in rem of mathematical and intuitive continuum (Weyl 1994,
93). InWeyl’s approach if we have to talk about continuity, e.g., in the geom-
etry of straight lines, then space-points may be only meant as functions of,
referring to a coordinate system which unavoidably “fullls” the underlying
act of a pure sense creating ego (Weyl 1994, 94). is way, a space-point is
taken as associated with a “motion” corresponding to a coordinate system in
terms of which it “moves,” its motion being actually an abstract scheme to
represent its constitution as “being-in-the-ow” within an immanent self-
constituting unity.
On this account, the principle that to each (temporal) point belonging,
e.g., to a unit time-span interval, corresponds a real number and vice versa
is merely a kind of conventional continuity axiom that stands in contrast to
the intuitively evident “being-of-the-ow.” Yet it is established as a corner-
stone of a pure arithmetical analysis which is necessitated by the need of an
extra axiomatical principle, extraneous to rst-order logic, to accede to a de-
scription of continuous processes originating in a time or space theory. As
it may be already seen Weyl shied his theoretical focus to the discrepancy
between an intuitively given continuum and the concept of number as a time
or space point, primarily turning his attention to the temporal continuum
as the most fundamental one. He claimed that this discrepancy would cease
to exist if the following conditions were met:
(1) Insofar as a certain intuition is associated with temporal duration, a
temporal expression of the kind “during a certain period L, I see this man
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crossing the street,” might be replaced by the expression “in every time-point
which falls within the time span L, I see this man crossing the street.”
(2) If P is a time-point and OE is a certain time span, supposing that
we have constructed an elementary theory of time on the assumption of a
time-point as a basic category and the relations “earlier” and “equal” dened
accordingly in a natural way, then the domain of rational numbers to which
the number є belongs so thatOL =єOE for a time-point L arbitrarily “earlier”
than P, can be constructed arithmetically in pure number theory based on
certain principles of denition set by Weyl to dene a real number. Further,
on this assumption and taking OE as a unit time span to every time-point
P corresponds a denite real number and conversely to every real number
corresponds a denite time-point; [Continuity Principle] (Weyl 1994, 89).
On the supposition that a pure theory of time can be founded by the
postulation of a time-point as a basic category and the relations of “earlier”
and “equal” dened in a natural way compatible with the intuition of time,
Weyl claimed in the rst place that the very intuition of time might suf-
ce to determine the one-to-one correspondence between time-points and
real numbers. Obviously such a correspondence not only cannot be demon-
strated, it is even intuitively unthinkable andWeyl considered this talk as ut-
terly nonsensical to the extent that a “theoretical clarication of the essence
of time’s continuous ow is not forthcoming” inasmuch as continuum fails
to satisfy certain features of rst-order calculus described in the rst chap-
ter of DK. Moreover the notion of “a point in the continuum lacks the re-
quired support in intuition” (Weyl 1994, 90). Further, pointing implicitly
to the Husserlian description of the inner time-consciousness by the claim
that to every temporal point corresponds a denite experiential whole, he
tried to strengthen his argument on the discrepancy of mathematical and
intuitive continuum by referring also to the retentional schemes of the tem-
poral ux of consciousness. On this account, having an original impression
at some instant A necessarily implies that one has already in place and in
an a priori mode except for the primary memory7 of A the primary memo-
ries corresponding to the original impressions for all instants Bi occurring
7 e primary memory is well-known to phenomenologists to be the a priori associated
“imprint” within consciousness of each original impression which should not be confused
with the actively re-producedmemory (rememoration) in the actual nowof consciousness.
is sentence is dicult to understand. Also, maybe we should aim for avoiding word
repetition here? “known [. . . ] to phenomenologists,” “well known to phenomenologists.”
Also, here and elsewhere, maybe “a priori” should be in italics for the sake of clarity?
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an arbitrarily short time earlier than A.ese instants Bi are constituted in
consciousness as a descending continuous degradation of retentions.8
At this point already came to Weyl’s attention the inherent circularity
in the description of the intuitive continuum in terms of the ux of tem-
poral consciousness. e innite sequence of point-like moments of expe-
rience tting endlessly into one another in the progression of time and in
the form of a continuous unity apprehended as such at any moment of re-
ection ultimately seemed to him as an absurdity. He was intuitive enough
to note that abstracting each temporal now from its being-in-the-ux as
part of a changing experiential content and treating it as an object of re-
ection, it would then instantly become a being-in-the-ux in its own right
in which one could place new points possibly associated with new original
impressions. In fact, this may be taken as a rst step in facing the tantaliz-
ing question of an endlessly regressing sequence of reections which the ego
of temporal consciousness may bear on its objectied self. Ultimately Weyl
landed in questioning the nature of continuity, in other words the owing
from point to point as ever eluding us, “in other words, the secret of how
the continually enduring present can continually slip away into the receding
past” (Weyl 1994, 92).
Of course the original Husserlian approach to the modes of constitution
of temporal consciousness is far more articulate than Weyl’s brief reference
to the absurdity of passing from an innite series of moments of perceptual
experience to the apprehension of a continuously progressing experiential
whole. In his main treatise on the phenomenology of time consciousness
Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeibewusstseins (Lessons on the
Phenomenology of Inner-Time Consciousness) (1966), Husserl dealt with the
issue of the apparent incompatibility of the point-like character of each time
perceptual experiences registered by an intentionally oriented conscious-
ness as original impressions and the constitution of a temporal duration as a
denite immanent whole by primarily appealing to two diverse intentional
forms, the transversal (Querintentionalität) and the longitudinal intention-
ality (Längstintentionalität) of consciousness (Husserl 1966, §38, §39).
It is notable, though, that in the Husserlian phenomenology the ulti-
mate step to reach the prima causa of the continuous unity of the temporal
ux in the present now of reection, involves a quite obscure notion which
is the absolute (or pure) ego of consciousness, a notion Husserl was trying
to clarify till his latest years only with limited success almost certainly due
to the essentially transcendental character of this kind of subjectivity. It is
8 e reader interested in a more detailed description of the intentional forms of the ux of
consciousness (namely the transversal and the longitudinal intentionality) should consult
the original Husserlian texts in (Husserl 1966, §11, §12, §38, §39).
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noteworthy that although Weyl did not enter into the deep waters of the
transcendence of the absolute ego, yet he was reserved enough to note that
Each one of us, at everymoment, directly experiences the true charac-
ter of this temporal continuity. But, because of the genuine primitive-
ness of phenomenal time, we cannot put our experiences into words.
(Weyl 1994, 92)
Onemay apply similar argumentationwith regard to any intuitively given
continuum, in particular to the continuum of spatial extension (Weyl 1994,
92). In fact, in original Husserlian view spatial continuum is considered as
an objective formof temporal fulllment. More specically, Husserl referred
to temporal extension as “fraternal” (verschwistert) to the spatial one. He
pointed out that
Like temporality, spatiality pertains to the essence of the appearing
thing. e appearing thing, whether changing or unchanging, en-
dures and lls a time; furthermore it fullls a space, its space, even if
this may be dierent at dierent points of time. If we abstract from
time and extract a point of the thing’s duration, then to the time-lling
content of the thing there belongs the thing’s spatial expanse. (Husserl
1973, 55)
As a matter of fact in view of the phenomenologically founded incom-
patibility between mathematical and intuitive continuumWeyl was eventu-
ally totally dismissive of the validity of the notion of an individual point as an
independent, self-standing object. Concerning objectively constituted time
he came to conclude that:
(1) An individual point in it [constituted inner temporality] is non-
independent, i.e., it is pure nothingness when taken by itself and ex-
ists only as a “point of transition” (which, of course, can in no way be
understood mathematically); (2) it is due to the essence of time (and
not to contingent imperfections in our medium) that a xed time-
point cannot be exhibited in any way, that always only an approxi-
mate, never an exact determination is possible. (Weyl 1994, 92)
On these grounds one may not be entitled to a formalization of the con-
tinuum based on the exact concept of a real number in that, ontologically
speaking, there exists a kind of redundancy which is le “untreated” in the
mathematical denition of real numbers by rational or non-standard ap-
proximations e.g. by approximating rational sequences or by ad hoc non-
conventional entities in the formof innitesimals. At this pointWeyl seemed
to resort to some kind of ultimate subjectivity referred to as “Logos dwelling
in reality” (Weyl 1994, 93), which is reminiscent of the phenomenological
pure ego, yet avoided any further descent into these murky waters.
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In the bottom line, in Weyl’s view, one should settle for a theory of con-
tinuum that establishes its reasonableness the way a physical theory does.
One could cite, for instance, quantum-mechanical theory which establishes
its authority by seeking a rational justication provided by its interpreta-
tive and predictive power in the derived “exact” physical world subjected to
certain idealizations with regard to its pre-predicative experiential origins.
Consequently the abstract scheme of real numbers associatedwith the possi-
bility of innite embeddings of possible parts into a presupposed completed
whole and that of functions as uniquely-valued correspondences of “overlap-
ping” continua are rationally justied in the context of an objective reality
which is of a constitutive sense; meaning one that is “meaningful” only in
the presence of at least one phenomenological reduction performing con-
sciousness.9 In this sense a real analysis, as we know it, can give an exact
account of various physical phenomena within an idealized objective world
e.g., in the description of the motion of a point along a surface. Yet, it is un-
reasonable to construct a space-time theory as a formal-mathematical disci-
pline without conceding to the impossibility of existence of a single time- or
space-point as a self-standing individual of experience solely characterized
by its properties insofar as time-space points are apprehended solely within
the continuous owof immanent temporality.is is amajor impediment to
the possibility of a space-time theory construed as a formal-axiomatical one
by postulating a continuity axiom which guarantees that given a unit time
span OE to every point P of OE corresponds a real number and vice versa.
is impredicativity-generating incongruence is also implicitly in place in
Weyl’s subsequent proposal (which he did not elaborate further) to provide
a higher-order analysis, termed by him hyperanalysis, in which real num-
bers are admitted as a basic category like naturals and where certain sets are
introduced in whose denition the existential quantiers refer to real num-
bers.10
Ultimately Weyl saw the points of a space-time theory only relative to a
coordinate system, that is, essentially as functions of a “meaning-providing
something” in the understanding that they cannot be construed as self-stand-
9 In rough terms one can refer to the phenomenological attitude in contrast to the natural at-
titude as the performance of the phenomenological reduction by an intentionally directed
consciousness in which things of the objective world are put into “parentheses” in absolute
ontological terms and taken as only valid in their appearance as such and such within con-
sciousness. (Considering that this is a claricatory footnote, for the sake of clarity I would
also consider slicing this sentence up into shorter sentences.)is includes the possibility
of consciousness to reect on itself.
10 As a matter of fact more sets of real numbers are generated in hyperanalysis than in stan-
dard analysis. In this case the totality of points of spaces, surfaces, lines, etc., can be con-
structed arithmetically as three-dimensional sets of real numbers (Weyl 1994, 95–96).
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ing entities but only relative to a coordinate system which is thought of as
the “residue” of the objectifying ego aer its eradication in the geometrical-
physical world. Yet they are thought to be grounded all the same on the
world of experience as primordially given and susceptible to the objectica-
tion process originating in the sense-giving ego (Weyl 1994, 94).
In short, Weyl admitted even indirectly to insurmountable obstacles,
pertaining to the subjective foundation of the continuum, in achieving its
formalization in a way that real numbers as well-dened individuals would
represent time- or space points while staying clear of any sort of circularity
in the construction.is led him to point out that
both contemporary analysis and its principles are le hanging in a
nebulous limbo half-way between intuition and the world of formal
concepts - even though, under the mask of its vague presentations of
set and function, analysis is able to pass itself o as a science operating
in the formal-conceptual sphere. (Weyl 1994, 96)
is is an argumentation that may also apply against his proposed ver-
sion of hyperanalysis to the extent that it claims to introduce sets by quanti-
fying over real numbers in the place of basic-category objects. More speci-
cally, the “lling-in” and the “there is” principles11 as principles arising from
the three major theses of Weyl’s approach, namely from denitionism, intu-
itionism and predicativism, essentially refer to natural numbers in the sense
of primitive objects (and relations) given straightforward to us by intuition
whichmoreover, taken as a basic category of entities, forma complete system
of denite self-existent objects. Accordingly, Weyl’s proposed hyperanalysis
11 e “lling-in” and the “there is” principles are respectively established in (Weyl 1994) as
follows:
If, for instance, U(xyz) is a judgment with three blanks and a is a given
object of our [basic] category, then the judgment U(xya), which is
produced by the operation of “lling in,” is one with only two blanks. In
particular a closed judgment (i.e., one without blanks), a judgment in
the proper sense, which arms a state of aairs, arises from a judgment
schemewhen all its blanks are lled by certain given objects of our category.
Let[. . . ]U(xyz) be a judgment with three blanks. en we can form
the judgment U(xy∗) = V(xy), which means “ere is an object z of
our [basic] category such that the relation U(xyz) obtains.” Similarly, we
can form U(∗y∗), meaning “ere is an object x and an object z such
that U(xyz) is true.” e number of blanks of a judgment scheme will
be reduced by application of this scheme too. If no blanks at all are le,
then here again a judgment in the proper sense arises, about which it is
appropriate to ask whether it is true or not. (Weyl 1994, 10–11)
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must at least admit to a conception of real numbers as well-dened individ-
uals possibly identiable with points of a space-time span by the Continuity
Principle,12 (even in discarding the possibility of their generation by a ho-
mogenous iteration operation), so as to rightfully claim the introduction of
new sets by quantifying over real numbers in the place of basic-category ob-
jects. In short, one is about to be faced again with the “vague” nature of
real numbers as presumed individuals of an axiomatical form of space-time
theory by reproducing a circularity on the level of hyperanalysis.
However the constraints of Weyl’s restriction principle, namely his pred-
icativist rejection of the notion of a set as a denite totality to quantify over,
can be partly overcome by the (so-called) arithmetismwhich is considered a
way to legitimize quantication over sets on the condition of a partial appli-
cation of abstraction on their elements (Bernard 2009, 158, 162–163). More
specically, one can imagine a totality of sets in which at least one variable
n ∈ N is le independent as an enumerator of the sets within the totality,
producing in eect a function R(n) which may generate a set as a totality
without infringing on Weyl’s restriction principle. For example, one can de-
ne a real number as a set of rationals by leaving as an independent (not
abstracted) variable the natural number n enumerating the sequence of its
rational approximations. Yet even Weyl’s iteration principle13 for partially
abstracted functions is not exempt of the possibility of quantifying over ob-
jects greater than Level 1 (in the sense of a ramied type theory) in order to
introduce new entities or relations. On this account one may refer without
entering intomore technical details to S. Feferman’s introduction of a formal
systemW, proved to be a conservative extension of the Peano Arithmetic, to
accommodate Weyl’s mathematics in DK where there is no obvious den-
abilitymodel ofW inwhich the class of all total functions of natural numbers
(N → N) consists of arithmetical functions (Feferman 1998, 279).14 Conse-
quently, and in view of the existing (equivalent) characterizations of hyper-
12 See, page 105.
13 In less technical terms the iteration principle, which “expands” the iterative structure of nat-
ural numbers and in a certain sense the intuitive accessibility of naturals toward totalities
of sets, claims that a totality of objects obtained by successive iterations of a homogenous
one-to-one set-theoretical operation Φ(X) between objects of the same category can be
regarded as a complete totality available in turn for the denition of new entities.
14 Feferman, based on Kleene’s 2E computable functionals over N , has introduced a system
Wwhose denability model makes that the class of all total functions (N → N) consists of
the hyperarithmetic functions and the Π11 partial ones (Feferman 1998, 278–279).ere is
also a certain controversy regarding the capacity of the theory W to accommodate all sci-
entically applicablemathematics, in particular its capacity of consistently incorporating a
host of mathematical aspects of quantum mechanics. Yet Feferman thought that the mat-
ter can be properly treated by pure mathematical-topological means and does not seem to
pose a major “ontological” challenge for the theory W (Feferman 1998, 281–283).
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arithmetical sets, involving e.g., set-quantication of formulas of second-
order arithmetic or transnite recursion based on so-called Turing jumps, a
part of the intuitive clarity of the basic category of natural numbers which
would vindicate Weyl’s predicativist program seems to be missing.
In sum, Weyl sought to talk about sets as totalities of objects insofar as
this is done in the secure stepwiseway of a denitionist predicative approach,
providing as a basic category the set of natural numbers whose iterative gen-
eration lays eo ipso the heuristic signicance of their inductive character. On
this motivation, and mainly on account of the iteration principle, he tried to
provide explicit and predicative denitions of subsets and functions within
classical logic while seeking to evade impredicative traps by substituting the
general denition of sets with that of denable sequences of reals. Yet, he
was plainly admitting that
the continuity given to us immediately by intuition (in the owof time
and in motion) has yet to be grasped mathematically as a totality of
discrete “stages” in accordance with that part of its content which can
be conceptualized in an “exact” way. More or less arbitrarily axioma-
tized systems [. . . ] cannot further help us here. Wemust try to obtain
a solution which is based on objective insight. (Weyl 1994, 24)
In other words Weyl’s predicativist denitions of sets and functions up
to the introduction of ideal elements through the new approach, was ul-
timately faced with the imposition in rem of the incompatible concepts of
points and intervals as fundamental structures of a space-time continuum.
Further, thismeans that one had to reconcile the intuitively accessiblemeans
provided by a theory founded on the conception of natural numbers as a
basic category of objects with the essential nature of intuitive continuum as
an ever changing state-of-aairs, associated moreover with an inner tempo-
rality and thereby rendering the notion of space-time points as immutable
individualities a meaningless notion.
It should be reminded thatWeyl’s choice to restrict attention to denable
sets of the rst level, that is, essentially to the category of natural numbers
as the absolute operational domain meant giving up the general least up-
per bound principle for the real number system. is kind of restriction
also brought out certain problems concerningWeyl’s iteration principle15 by
producing a relation of the type R∗Φ ( pn ,N) over the set of natural numbers
15 Weyl’s principle of iteration, presented in three dierent forms, can be summarily dened
in its simplest form as the recursive relationRn+1( xx′X ) = Rn( xx′F(x)), R1 = R, where relations
R1 , R2 , R3 ,. . . arise from a single original one R(n; xx′X )which has the blank n aliated with
the category “natural number” and lled in successively by 1, 2, 3,. . .e relation R( xx′X )
gives rise to the function F(X) and has its blanks divided into the dependent variables
x , x′ and the independent X with the latter aliated with the category of two-dimensional
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N which is not arithmetical in N (due to the diagonalization argument) and
hence not denable at level 0; for further details see: (Feferman 1998, 264–
265).
3. A phenomenologically motivated approach of the
mathematical continuum
Weyl’s attempt to do justice to his main positions of denitionism, pred-
icativism and his own version of intuitionism, led him to establish a pred-
icatively founded mathematics which would be ultimately divergent from
both Frege’s logicist approach and Russerl’s approach in the theory of log-
ical types, while preserving fundamental features of respective positions.
In at least one crucial point, he distanced himself from Frege, Russell and
Poincaré, namely in that the principles of denition must be used to give “a
precise account of the sphere of the properties and relations to which the
sets and mappings correspond” (Weyl 1994, 47).
He rejected, in particular, the Fregean denition of natural numbers as
equivalence classes as well as the reducibility axiom in Russell’s Principia
which he thought were incompatible with his “narrower” procedure asso-
ciated with the conception of sets and functions founded on the iteration
principle. In fact his meaning of the concept of a set lent a substantial con-
tent to the following assertion: “To every point of a line (given an origin
and a unit of length) corresponds a (distance measuring) real number (=
a set of rational numbers with the properties a), b) and c)16 and vice versa”
(Weyl 1994, 49).is noteworthy assertion establishes a connection between
something given by space intuition (points in space) and something (the set
of real numbers) generated by a logical conceptual way. Yet, Weyl conceded
to the insuciency of this assertion with respect to what is given us by intu-
ition, more specically the assertion above does not oer a morphological
description of what is given to our intuition as a constant temporal ow. It
rather does so by giving an exact “representation” of an immediately given
reality in the actual now of reection while missing at the same time the
grasp of the intuitive evidence of a homogenous ow and further the pos-
sibility to describe in exact logical-theoretical terms what is by its nature
inexact.
sets whose blanks are lled in with the same categories of objects as the dependent x , x′ in
R.
16 In Weyl’s denition of a real number as a one-dimensional set α of rational numbers the
following properties hold: a) if r is an element of α, then so is every other rational r′ such
that r−r′ is positive; b) for every element r of α there is a rational number r∗, also belonging
to α, such that r∗− r is positive c) α is non-empty, but not every rational number is an
element of α (Weyl 1994, 31).
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is constant temporal process,Weyl stressed, is vital to all exact knowl-
edge of physical reality and through this very process mathematics becomes
relevant as a metatheory of natural science. In a denite sense Weyl’s re-
construction of the intuitive continuum within a “symbolic universe” ought
to establish its reasonableness beyond strict formal consistency in the same
way a physical theory does and its direct evidence should formally result as
faithfully as possible as presented in intersubjective identity . Ultimately, as
discussed already, Weyl was unable to overcome the inherent incompatibil-
ity generated by the vague nature of continuum, as subjectively constituted,
in contrast with the “exact” nature of formal mathematical objects some-
thing that ultimately led him to put in doubt the objective existence of the
“points” of continuum (Weyl 1994, 90).
It is noteworthy that Weyl had the insights, well before Gödel’s incom-
pleteness results, to sense the restrictions posed by formalism/convention-
alism to the meaning-content of mathematics for which certain determina-
tions should be implemented other than those taking its objects/state-of-
aairs as simply the result of logical inferences derived from a prescribed set
of axioms. In this respect, he argued against the position that mathematical
statements as, for instance, Fermat’s Lasteorem, aremere consequences of
arithmetical axioms by citing an example in which the arithmetical axioms
cannot guarantee a sound meaning to the existential predication “there is,”
therefore putting into doubt the consistency and completeness of Peano’s
axiomatical system of arithmetic and Dedekind’s completeness of the real
numbers system. Prompted by his denitionist-predicativist approach and
Cantor’s proof of the non-denumerability of reals, he had also the mathe-
matical acuteness to foresee the independence of the Axiom of Choice by
proposing that “naturally there is no reason at all to assume that every in-
nite set must contain a denumerable subset - a consequence from which I
certainly do not shrink” (Weyl 1994, 28).17
In view of these positions one can reasonably argue that Weyl was not
only preoccupied with the incompatibility between the spatiotemporal con-
tinuum, founded on the intuition of the continuous ow of temporality,
and the existing mathematical analysis, but he was also concerned with the
sterility of strictly formalist approaches of mathematics. is attitude, to
the extent that it recognized a sort of objective reality of mathematical ob-
jects originating in the categories of primitive objects and their relations and
17 Weyl’s point in the quoted assertion is that the innity of a set does not guarantee by itself
that there will be a constructive pairing function whose domain is the set of natural num-
bers and whose range is a subset of the innite set in question; in other words one has to
postulate the possibility of choice as an axiom independently of the meaning-content of
innity in general.
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insofar as it refuted the notion of innite sets as denite totalities by the
restriction and iteration principles, distanced itself as a matter of fact from
both later Hilbertian nitistic formalism and Carnap’s logical-syntactical
program for mathematical theories. More than this, Weyl converged in a
certain sense to Gödel’s critical attitude toward the respective theoretical po-
sitions in recognizing that there is some kind of deciency of mathematical
theories, originating in their formal-axiomatical structure, with respect to
the objective existence ofmathematical entities.ese latter entities taken as
evidences knowledgeable by primitive world-experience and consequently
conditioned at least partly by the modes of constitution of that experience.
It turns out that a more profound and phenomenologically motivated
analysis of intuitive continuum, taken in Weyl’s monograph as intimately
associated with the notion of space-time continuum, should concentrate on
the deeper meaning of points as individuals-objects of intentional experi-
ence in contrast with the meaning of intervals as impredicatively dened to-
talities bearing subtotalities of the same genus and embodying the notion of
duration. On this account, it seems quite problematic how one can possibly
build a space-time theory by dening space-time points as individuals rep-
resented by real numbers when there is no intuition of a durationless time
point in the ow of any (within-the-world) experience. Moreover, it seems
doubtful whether one can have the intuition of a set of points (these latter
taken as set-theoretical individuals) without conceding to the existence of a
non-eliminable temporal factor conditioning by the underlying (impredica-
tive) unity of temporal consciousness the very act of colligating an indenite
collection of formal objects in the form of denite wholes in the present now
of consciousness.18
One faces, in fact, the challenge of building a theory of the most primi-
tive entities and their essential relations while being constrained at the same
time by intuitions deeply rooted in a constituted and subjectively generated
temporality which cannot be apprehended in reection but as the “ever-
changing” homogenous unity of immanent objects with the modalities of
being such and such.
erefore, one may raise the question of how we can have a proper in-
terpretation of the essential distinctness between points and the intervals of
the continuum, indeed of how we can have a proper theory of space-time
continuum, without taking into account what is originally given to us as
non-mediated experience. at is, without doing justice at the same time
18 e act of colligating a denite or indenite collection of formal objects in the form of
completed wholes and as such turned to thematic objects “in front of ” the intentionality
of the ego of consciousness is termed in Husserl’s Experience and Judgment a retrospective
apprehension (rückgreifendes Erfassen) (Husserl 1939, 246).
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to the intuition of a temporally founded continuum annulling by its own
non-eliminability the denability of any object—be it a material or formal
one—as a durationless immutable object within the world. At this point it is
of primary importance to have in mind the content that may be given to the
concept of mathematical objects and their relations in general. Are they to
be regarded in the commonly shared view of many platonistic logicians and
philosophers of mathematics as atemporal, unalterable objects (and for that
reason mind-independent) or rather as subjectively constituted objects of
intentionality enjoying “articially” by virtue of their intersubjective veri-
cation within the world of experience the status of immutable transtemporal
entities retrievable any time at will in the form of well-meant objects in ac-
tuality?
My own position tends to side with the second option on the follow-
ing grounds: even in regarding mathematical objects as atemporal ones and
mind-independent, think for instance of the function z = tanpi(x− 12)which
helps prove the non-denumerability of a real interval, at the very instant they
become objects of the intentional directedness19 of a self-constituting tem-
poral consciousness by this very fact they are being “nullied” as atemporal
objects as they instantly become objects-in-front-of (a consciousness) adum-
brated moreover by the modes of being objects-in-front-of a consciousness.
is means that an object-in-front-of is given as such in original presence
together with its “inner” and “outer” horizon in reference to an intentional
consciousness which has grasped it as an unambiguous verication of its
enactment in the actual now and it is moreover susceptible of every possi-
ble modality in having become part of its immanence.is means a further
elaboration of the object’s-in-front-of inner horizon is possible by free vari-
ation in imagination, abstractive ideation, comparative reection, formal-
ization, etc. It follows that mathematical objects as objects of axiomatized
theories are each time potentially open to further clarication, further ac-
cession to possible hidden properties or relations insofar as they are made
objects of the intentional and further explicative regard of at least one subject
performing concrete intentional-cognitive acts within-the-world.
A view of mathematical-logical objects as receiving their whole sense
of being within the world from each subject’s intentionality is given by R.
Tieszen inAer Gödel: Platonism and Rationalism inMathematics and Logic
(2011). More specically, Tieszen points out that
19 e key terms intentional or intentionality are fully taken in this article in their phe-
nomenological connotation, that is, roughly asmeaning the a priori tendency of conscious-
ness toward “something in general” independently of a material or a general “thingness”
content.
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Taking our lead fromHusserl’s comments ine Idea of Phenomenol-
ogy, Ideas I, Formal and Transcendental Logic, and elsewhere, we can
say that ideal objects are also constituted as such by consciousness,
by the monad. [. . . ] whatever things are, mathematical objects or
logical included, they are as experienceable things. It is experience
alone that prescribes their sense. [. . . ] Nothing exists for me other-
wise than by the actual and potential performance of my own con-
sciousness. Whatever is given as an existing object in mathematics
or logic is something that has received its whole sense of being from
my intentionality.ere is no conceivable place where the life of con-
sciousness could be broken through so that we might come upon a
transcendent mathematical or logical object that had any other sense
than that of an intentional unity (invariant) making its appearance in
the subjectivity of consciousness. (Tieszen 2011, 97)
4. Points as empty-of-content substrates of intentionality
Canwe have formal “lowest-level” individuals (think possibly of the “points”
of the formal space-time theory) as immanent objects independently of an
absolute temporal position, the latter state-of-aairs implying their existence
as spatio-temporal and therefore “real world” objects? In view of Weyl’s in-
quiry in DK discussed in the previous sections about the possibility of in-
terchanging the notion of space-time points with that of real numbers and
further the relation of both to spatiotemporal and phenomenological con-
tinuum this question is of crucial importance.
In this connection it is important to see that even thoughHusserl denied
in Erfahrung und Urteil (Experience and Judgment) the status of genuine in-
dividuals to the objects of imagination, thus depriving them of the possibil-
ity of founding their identication, he nevertheless ascribed an ambivalent
status to such individuals; in fact he termed them quasi individuals and the
associated identities quasi-identities. He claimed that there is a notion of
time that may be associated with these quasi-objects in terms of a broader
intuitive unity allotted to them by virtue of being “there” in the uniform
stream of consciousness (Husserl 1939, 174–175).
In view of what has been said so far my position concerning mathemat-
ical individuals can be summed up as follows: to the extent that mathe-
matical individuals are essentially taken as syntactical atoms of a formal-
mathematical theory assigned with a certain ontological sense, for instance
those bounded by universal-existential quantiers in a rst-order predicate
formula of the kind (∀x)(∃y)Q(x , y), they can be logically founded irre-
spective of their possible spatio-temporal “mirror-image,” that means, solely
by virtue of the intentionality of a subject’s “regard” free of any causality con-
straints. is means that they can be founded as content-free fulllments
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of intentional acts which should not be by necessity causally related with
objects-individuals existing in objective spatio-temporal terms. is is a
view shared also by Tieszen in (Tieszen 2011), in which he refers to the pos-
sibility of the non-existence of an object in real terms even though our (in-
tentional) awarenessmay be directed to it as if there were indeed such an ob-
ject. Precisely by virtue of their nature unconstrained by spatio-temporal or
causal determinations and also due to their intersubjectively founded iden-
tity over time, mathematical-formal individuals can serve as universals of
formal-axiomatical theories bearing an ontological sense through bounded
predicate formulas.
In these terms the question of the possible existence and themodes of ex-
istence of objects as fulllments of concrete intentional enactments is “freed”
from the constraints of their absolute existence as real spatio-temporal ob-
jectivities. Husserl had thought of quasi-individuals and generally of quasi-
objects, taken as objects of imagination,20 as united in amost inclusive unity
of intuition which cannot be a unity of objectivities in absolute world-time
to the extent that objects of imagination and generally objects in the sense of
mere intentional enactments have no temporal connection either with ob-
jects of perception or among themselves (in real-world terms).is kind of
unity is not a unity of objectivities; “it can only be a unity of the lived ex-
periences that constitute objectivities, of lived experiences of perception, of
memory, and of imagination” (Husserl 1939, 175).
Consequently and inasmuch as the unity of lived experiences is evidently
bound by Husserl to the continuous ow of inner-time consciousness, the
connection that might be established with these quasi-objects on the inten-
tional level cannot in principle be causally grounded one.
An individual in purely formal abstraction can therefore be thought of
as founded on the a priori enactment of the intentional direction of con-
sciousness, this latter being totally inconceivable without orienting itself to-
ward “anything-whatsoever” (etwas überhaupt). In fact an individual in this
sense can be brought upon into evidence as intuitively self-given each time of
reection.21 A “lowest-level” individual as an abstract individual is impene-
20Objects of imagination might be thought of as a general category of objects immanent to
the consciousness and freed of real-world constraints among which one can think, as a
“subspecies” enjoying a special status, mathematical or logical objects. Tieszen thinks of
the objects of mathematics and logic as mind-independent in the sense of immanent to
the consciousness objects of intentionality which are nonetheless constituted in a rational
motivation throughout our experience in mathematical practice (Tieszen 2011, 104–105).
21 ink, for instance, in extreme introspection as emptying yourself of any contemplative
thought, pushing beyond any kind of focusing on whatever imaginable object or state-of-
aairs; then you can see that you are by necessity oriented in extremis to a vague, indenite,
boundless and yet non-eliminable “something-there.”
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trable in terms of a thingness content since we cannot bring into reection
something “internal” to it in the formof a new concrete something-there and
in the contemplative relation part-of. In other words, the content of each
vacuous intentional act, eliminating any possible higher-level distraction,
may be taken as founding the notion of an irreducible individual (includ-
ing quasi-individuals in the sense attributed in Experience and Judgment),
appropriating a host of categorial properties by virtue of being objectied
as a general Dies-da (this-here) through the enactment of intentional ori-
entation. is kind of impenetrability in reection may be thought of, at
this level of evidence, as founding individuality in rem independently of any
reference to a really existing object-counterpart, while the single act of seiz-
ing it in the present now of consciousness may be thought of as founding
meta-logically its uniqueness.
Onemay note that Husserl was careful to clarify that “individuation and
identity of the individual, as well as the identication founded on it is only
possible within the world of actual experience, on the basis of absolute tem-
poral position” (Husserl 1939, 173–174). Consequently imagination, in gen-
eral, does not generate individuals as irreducible objects associated with a
xed temporal position and spatial content but only quasi-objects and quasi-
identities in the broadly conceived unity of intuition. In this approach, such
individualsmay not serve as ultimate self-evidences in laying the foundation
of a theory of judgments, even though in Husserl’s earlier texts (in Ideen I)
“lowest-level” substrates of analytical sentences in the sense of ultimate phe-
nomenological evidences, that is, as noematical nuclei-forms (Kerngebilde)
deprived of any “inner” analytical content, even of a temporal form, and
consequently not necessarily associated with the world of real experience
are thought of as establishing the foundation of such objects of mathemati-
cal theories, as numbers, sets, classes, functions of sets or classes, Euclidean
or non-Euclidean domains, etc., (Husserl 1976, 33–34). Consequently the
aboveHusserlian view in Ideen I does not contradict the possibility of found-
ing formal-mathematical individuals as fundamentally intentional objects
(of a special status) not necessarily associated with a subject in causal terms
within objective spatio-temporality.
Individuals such as those associated with actual experience and quasi-
individuals of imaginary intuition (also individuals of memory) can be “em-
bedded” in the unity of intuition only insofar as they are encompassedwithin
the unity of constituted time, this way conditioning the unity of a plural-
ity of various objects brought to the immanence of consciousness on self-
Stathis Livadas 119
constituting inner temporality.22 Indeed, all immanent objects, togetherwith
actual relations (concerning objects of actual experience) or quasi-relations
concerning objects of memory or imagination, including mathematical ob-
jects as objects of categorial or eidetic intuition are ultimately conditioned
on the intuition of the unity of time reduced in turn to the phenomenology
of absolute temporal consciousness and its pure ego (Husserl 1939, 182).
Ultimately as the possibility of existence of “lowest-level” individuals of a
mathematical theory is not necessarily associatedwith a spatio-temporal po-
sition founded on real-world objectivity one may get as a consequent result
the ontological “suspension” of Weyl’s proposed continuity principle (Weyl
1994, 6) insofar as it seeks to establish a one-to-one correspondence between
the points of a time span and real numbers in taking time-points as individ-
uals in objective time.
5. e possibility of a causality-free innity
e present approach to the notion of formal-syntactical individuals as in-
dependent of spatio-temporal constraints can possibly extend to a notion
of innity also made free of spatio-temporal and consequently causal con-
straints. is kind of innity is grounded in the immanence of conscious-
ness and vestiges of this position are recognized from as early on as Husserl’s
Philosophie der Arithmetik. In this early work, generally considered as rather
belonging to the psychologistic phase of Husserl’s evolving phenomenologi-
cal formation, Husserl referred to the inner experience as the evident factor
for the possibility of representing a multiplicity of objects as an instanta-
neous lived experience (Husserl 1970, 24).
In later works, Husserl elaborated the conception of an immanent whole
of multiplicities of appearances in terms of the continuous unity of a self-
constituting temporal consciousness. In fact the foundation of continuous
unity, as thematically presented in reection, was to ultimately rest on the
modes of constitution of temporal consciousness and more radically on its
self-constituting origin. At the time of Logische Untersuchungen (Logical In-
vestigations) he conceived of a kind of actual innity in presentational im-
mediacy in these terms:
e fact that we freely extend spatial and temporal stretches in
imagination, that we can put ourselves in imagination at each fancied
boundary of space or time while ever new spaces and times emerge
before our inward gaze—all this does not prove the relative founded-
ness (Fundierung) of bits of space and time, and so does not prove
22 One can construe an extension of relations of actuality subsisting between real individuals
to quasi ones and make them appear in the quasi mode “precisely as far as the unity of an
intuition of imagination and a world of imagination extends” (Husserl 1939, 187).
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space and time to be really innite, or even that they could be really
innite, nor even that they really can be so. is can only be proved
by a law of causation, which presupposes, and so requires, the possi-
bility of being extended beyond any given boundary. (Husserl 1984,
45)
Later in Experience and Judgment (which incorporated most of the key
ideas of previous works), aer having been engaged in the search for the
essential structure of temporal consciousness in thePhenomenology of Inner-
Time Consciousness and in the Bernau Manuscripts, Husserl referred to
a special kind of constitution of unity which provides the basis for
special relations, for the formal relations. It is the formal-ontological
unity, which neither rests on the actual connection of the ob-
jects united nor is founded on their essential moments or their entire
essence. (Husserl 1939, 188)
e objects and the relations referred to here are also thought to include,
in the broad sense of formal-ontological ones, such mathematical objects as
sets, classes, elements of sets or classes, functions and their domains, Eu-
clidean or non-Euclidean manifolds, etc.
In an apparent reference to his conception of formal ontological ob-
jects in Formal and Transcendental Logic,23 Husserl described this formal-
ontological unity as a collective form of unity extending to all possible ob-
jects individual or not individual. Further the unied “whole” of collection
becomes objective, as thematized, if a continuous apprehension of these ob-
jects one by one and in their totality takes place through a presentation in
the actuality of consciousness. is collective unity is essentially neither
founded on real space-time objectivity nor onmaterial elements to the point
that even the essence of things is not taken into consideration except insofar
as it makes dierentiation (between them) possible. By virtue of this unity
we may be provided with a subjective foundation to universal-existential
predicative forms in such a way that a proposition of the kind: “each and ev-
ery thing (everything possible and hence everything actual. . . such that). . . is
capable of being intuited as actual or possible in the actual present of one
consciousness” may be taken as equivalent to the proposition: “each and ev-
ery thing . . . (such that). . . is in principle capable of being colligated” (Husserl
1939, 189).
In these terms onemay have a notion of actual innity independent, as it
is the case with formal individuals-substrates, of spatiotemporal constraints
23 For a detailed description of the meaning of formal-ontological objects the reader is re-
ferred to Husserl’s Formale und Transcendentale Logik (Formal and Transcendental Logic)
(Husserl 1929, §24, §25, §37).
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and consequent causal concerns. In fact, this kind of immanent “innity,”
objectied as a completed whole in the instantaneous now of reection, is
whatmakesmathematics such an eective and inexhaustible tool in describ-
ing real world processeswhile by this token and in a certain holistic approach
may be seen as de facto establishing the non-decidability of key questions in
the foundations of mathematics (Livadas 2013; Livadas 2015). is kind of
non-causal innity to the extent that it may be, according to Gödel, linked
with “the psychological fact of the existence of an intuition suciently clear
to produce an open series of extensions of the axioms of set theory” (Gödel
1990, 268) may pertain also to the conception of transnite sets in general
as denite totalities and further to the ontological status of large cardinals,
e.g., of measurable or supercompact cardinals, and consequently underlie
the intelligibility of strong innity axioms.24
6. Conclusion
As already stated, Weyl sought to provide inDK an arithmetical foundation
of themathematical continuum, taken as essentially associatedwith the con-
tinuum of space-time, on the assumption of the eld of natural numbers as
themost basic ontological-categorial domain. In doing so, he was convinced
that arithmetical assertions, that is, those whose variables are exclusively re-
stricted to the domain of natural numbers (or to any isomorphic structures)
may have a denite truth-value attached to them in virtue of the fact that the
arithmetical theory pertaining to the naturals is most tting to a straightfor-
ward sense perception.
On the other hand, transnite assertions whose variables range over do-
mains of higher-level and not “self-standing” objectivities, i.e., those which
do not correspond to direct sensory intuition, may not have a denite truth-
value attached to them. In view of this, he espoused the restriction principle
to allow for expressions whose variables range solely over the basic domain
for which he oered the following justication:
Clearly we must take the other path—that is, we must restrict the ex-
istence concept to the basic categories (here, the natural and ratio-
nal numbers) and must not apply it in connection with the system of
properties and relations (or the sets, real numbers, and so on, cor-
responding to them). In other words, the only natural strategy is to
abide by the narrower iteration procedure. (Weyl 1994, 32)
In his own elaboration of a Husserlian perpective to Weyl’s DK, J. Da
Silva refers to ultimate syntactical substrates of any analytical sentencewhich
24ere is a broad discussion in foundational mathematics concerning the implicit role of
actual innity in determining innite mathematical objects as completed wholes which
cannot be dealt with further here; see, for instance, (Feferman 2009) and (Livadas 2017).
122 Weyl’s Conception of the Continuum
are admittedly syntactically irreducible on pain of an innite regression and
thought of as corresponding to evidences of experience, as naturally rep-
resented in Weyl’s analysis by the natural numbers (Da Silva 1997, 288). On
this account, ultimate individuals-substrates of formalmathematical expres-
sions given as evidences of pre-predicative experience (meant as prior to the
predicative act of making judgments) may be taken, in a revisiting of Weyl’s
analysis, as underlying the concept of the points-individuals of continuum
by virtue of being non-causally generated individuals of intentional experi-
ence independently of any spatiotemporal concerns.
On this ground and on the evidence of the unity of constituted tempo-
rality a new light may be shed to the lack of support in the intuition of a
durationless point in contrast to the immediately experienced continuity of
phenomenal time.
In this perspective I undertook a re-evaluation of the notion of the points
of a space-time meta-theory as reducible to vacuous (with no-“thingness”
content) individuals of intentional experience whose original givenness can
be, in an alternative phenomenologically motivated approach, dispensed
with causal and spatio-temporal constraints. At the same time I have tried
to bring about the possibility of an immanent “innity,” also independent of
any causal constraints pertaining to real-world experience, which is founded
instead on the continuous unity of inner-time consciousness to account for
the concept of completed wholes in the postulation of innity assumptions
and also of transnite objects in the mathematics of continuum.
In view of the incompatibility between space-time points, in the sense
of lowest-level individuals of a formal theory and time-intervals, founded
on the notion of an immanent “innity” ultimately reducible to a subjec-
tive temporal origin, Weyl’s attempt to a description of the real continuum
by purely arithmetical means was eventually doomed to fail on the phe-
nomenological grounds discussed in this paper.
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